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THE PROVISION OF TIME TO THE ELDERLY BY THEIR CHILDREN
ABSTRACT
This paper uses matched data on the elderly and their children to study
the provision of time by children to the elderly. It develops a Tobit model
as well as a structural model to analyze the determinants of this decision.
The main determinants of the amount of time given to parents appear to be the
parent's age, reported health, and institutionalization status, and the
children's age, health, and sex. Older parents, less healthy parents, and
non—institutionalized parents receive more time from their children, while
younger children, healthier children, and female children provide moretime.
In contrast to these demographic determinants, economic variables, such as
children's wage rate and iicome levels, appear to play a rather insignificant
role in the provision of time. In addition, the evidence does not support the
hypothesis that parents purchase time from their children.
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Has support of the aged by families declined in the post war period?
While the jury is still out, there is substantial evidence pointing in that
direction. Over 60 percent of the elderly (those over 60) now live alone
compared with only 25 percent in the 1940s. For the old old (those over 85)
the fraction living alone has increased from 13 percent to 57 percent. At the
same time there has been more than a tripling of the rate of
institutionalization; today almost a quarter of the old old live in
institutions compared with only 7 percent in the 1940s (Sandefur and Tuna,
1987). In addition to not living with the elderly, the children of the
elderly rarely provide financial transfers to the elderly (Kotlikoff and
Morris, 1989) and when they do, the amounts are typically quite meager.
One defense of the children's behavior is demographic; the current number
of children per elderly totals about half the number observed in the 1940s.
Since the elderly of today had fewer children than did their parents and have,
in some cases, succeeded in outliving their children, the current Situation
may be much of their own making. A second defense is that the relative income
position of the elderly has improved permitting them to live alone (Michael,
Fuchs, and Scott, 1980) and obviating the need for financial transfers from
their children. A variety of studies (e.g., Boskin, Kotlikoff, and Knetter,
1985 and Andrews and Hurd, 1990) have demonstrated that current poverty rates
of the elderly are close to, if not below, those of the nonelderly. Much of
the improvement in the relative incomes of the elderly is due to increases in
real social security benefits legislated in the l970s. A third point to
consider in assessing child support of the elderly involves payment for
nursing home care. A good fraction of the elderly in nursing homes are
private pay patients. Some of these payments are being made directly by—2—
children. While we are not aware of time series data on nursing home payments
by children, ic seems plausible that such payments per child measured at
constant dollars have increased over time.
While the elderly may need and appear to be receiving less financial help
from their children, their needs for compsnionship and physical assiatance may
well have increased in the postwar period; the increased longevity of the
elderly often means living for years in poor states of health. In addition,
those elderly who continue to live will lose a large fraction of their old
friends and even some of their children along the way. Most studies of the
increasingly separate living arrangements of the elderly conclude that these
arrangements reflect the preferences and improved financial means of the
elderly. In contrast, Kotlikof and Morris (1988) suggest that about half of
the elderly would prefer to live with their children, but continue to live
apart because of their children's preferences coupled with their children's
financial abilities to live apart from their parents.
One reason the jury remains out on family support of the aged involves
the issue of time spent by children with their elderly parents. As Morgan's
(1984) research suggests, children's provision of time to their elderly
parents is an importsnt, if not the most important, form of economic transfer
to the elderly by their children. This paper studies the provision of time by
children to their elderly parents. We use the 1986 Hebrew Rehabilitation
Center (HRCA) for the Aged follow—up survey of Massachusetts elderly and the
1986 NBER—HRCA survey of the children of these Massachusetts elderly. While
the child survey involved an interview of only one of the children of the
elderly (the one designated by the elderly), each child was ssked a set of
detsiled questions not only about his owncircumstances,but also about the
circumstances of each of his siblings. The combined data are unique in their—3—
detail of demographic and economic characteristics of the elderly and each of
their children.
We use these data to answer a number of questions about the provision of
time by children to their parents. These questions include: How does the
health Status of the elderly influence the amount of time given by children?
How does the health status of the children influence their provision of time
to their parents? Do parents with more income and wealth receive more time
from their children? How does the employment status and wage rates of
children affect their provision of time? Do children free ride on their
siblings provision of time? Are home care corporations used by children as a
substitute for their own time? Do the institutionalized elderly receive more
or less time? Are daughters, other things equal, more or less likely to
provide time?
We take two empirical approaches in studying the data. First, we
estimated Tobits for the provision of time by children. Second, we estimate a
structural model of the joint decision of children to work and to provide time
to their elderly parent. Since the opportunity cost of providing time to the
parent for working children is the wage, the structural model indicates how
wage rates influence the allocation of time by children to the elderly. The
model can account for corner solutions in the data; this is important because
some children do not work, some do not provide time to their parents, and some
neither work nor provide time.
Our model assumes that the child is altruistic in that he (she) cares
about the utility the parent receives from their time spent together. The
model does not, however, consider the utility the child might derive from the
consumption of the parent. Including the utility of parent's consumption in
the child's utility function would require an analysis of financial transfers—4—
from children to parents. But given thst only 2.6 percent of children in our
sample report making financial trsnsfers to their elderly parent(s), the extra
complications of modeling financial transfers seems to outweigh the potential
benefits.1 While we ignore financial transfers, the model does consider the
simultaneous decisions by siblings as to how much time each sibling should
provide the parent. The model assumes that each sibling takes time provided
to the parent as given; i.e. ,thesiblings play non—cooperative Nash.
Another issue not considered by the model is the possibility that
children are not altruistic, but, in effect, sell their time (a la Bernheim,
Shleiffer, and Summers, 1985) to their parents. The quid pro quo for this
sale of time is a financial payment by parents to their children. But such
transfers are also quite rare in our sample. In our sample only .9 percent of
children report receiving financial transfers from their parents. In
addition, as described below, children receiving financial transfers from
their parents are no more likely to provide time to their parents than those
not receiving transfers. While the possibility remains that parents pay for
time transfers by leaving larger future bequests, it is not clear how one
would estimate the magnitude of such contingent payments.
Section I presents our simple structural model. Section II describes the
data and our sample selecdon. Section III presents Tobit estimates of the
allocation of time by children to their parents. Section IV presents maximum
likelihood estimates of the structural model. Section V summarizes the
paper's findings and provides suggestions for future research.—5—
I. A Simple Structural Model of the Joint Labor Supply andTimeProvision
Decisions
A. The Model
Ourmodelassumes that the child's utility is logarithmic and depends on
his consumption, leisure, and the total amount of time the parent receives
from himself (herself) and his (her) siblings. The utility function of
sibling i, U, is given by
(1) Ui —ologC+8logi+log(d+ d,+ 1)
jøi
In (1) a, ,andm are constants. The terms C, 1, d, and dj (jri) stand,
respectivly, for consumption of child i, leisure of child i, time provided
to the parent by child i, and tIme provided to the parent by sibling j. There
are N siblings of child i. The unitary displacement value in the logarithm
or time received by parent ensures the possibility that child i will provide
zero time to his (her) parent even in the case that all his (her) siblings
also provide zero time.
The child maximizes this function subject to constraints (2), (3), and
(2) C ￿ W(l_I_d) +
(3) diO
(4) di+2.i
Equation (2) says that consumption cannot exceed labor earnings plus exogenous
income, Y. Equation (2) says that time provided to the parent cannot be
negative, and equation (3) says that the sumofleisure time plus time spent—6—
with the parent cannot exceed the endowment of time which is normalized to
unity.
Since (2) will always be binding, solutions for the values of and d
satisfy:
oW




Letting Ja and []bstand, respectively, for the values in the square
bracket in (6) and (7), we have the following four cases: 1) di+2il and d=0
(the child is retired and provides no time) holds if [a>0 and [] <;2)
and d>O (the child is retired and provides time) holds if ]a >0
and []b—°;3) d1+e<l and d1—0 (the child works and provides no time) holds
[1a—0 and []b<0; and 4) d+1<l and di>0 (the child works and
provides time) holds if ]a0 and 1
B. Estimation
Thecondition that ['a° implies: —log(Wt)logo_
log,and thecondition (}￿0implies: In
these expressions each child has individual—specific preference parameters,
i.e. •aand are subscripted by i. We let loga —xjD + and lO&Bj —X')
+ u1, where Xj' is a vector of characteristics of child i and his parent(s), 9
and S are coefficient vectors, and and Uj are mean zero independent normal
errors with bivariate density f(,u1). Define Hi log(Wj(l—1i—di)+Yi) ——7—
log(Wi) —x'9+Xj'iand Z .log1j_log(d+Ej_jdj+Di) then H j —Vj
and Z ￿uj. The probability of observing child i working and providing time
can now be expresaed as:
(8) Prob(H.—p.—u.and Z.—v.) —f(Hi+Zj,Zi)
where Hi and Z are evaluated at the observed values of and di.
The probability of observing child i retired and providing time is:
H.+Z.
(9) Prob(H.>ji.—u. and Z._vi) —Jf(i,zi)di
where H and Z are evaluated at the observed value of di and is evaluated
at 1 minus the observed value of d.
The probability of observing child i retired and providing no time is:
H.+u.
(10) Prob(Hi>,Aj_ui and Zi<u.) —ff f(.,u)duidi
zi
where H and Z are evaluated d1=O and 2—l.
The probability of observing child i working and providing no time is:
(11) Prob(H_pj_u1 and Zi<v.) —Jf(Hj+ui,uj)du
zi
where Hi and are evaluated at di=0 and equals 1 minus the observed
amount of time child i spends working.
Denote Lk as the probability of the observed labor supply and time





II. The Data, Sample Section Criteria, andDataCharacteristics
A. The 1986 HRCA Elderly Survey and the 1986 NBER—HRCA Child Survey
The 1986 HRCA Survey of the Elderly is part of an ongoing panel survey of
Massachusetts elderly which began in 1982. In addition to the 1982 and 1986
surveys, the elderly sample was reinterviewed in 1984, 1985, 1987, and 1989.
The 1986 NBER—HRCA Child Survey is a survey of the children of those elderly
interviewed in the 1986 HRCA Survey of the Elderly. One child of each elderly
respondent was interviewed and asked a set of questions concerning his (her)
household, his (her) parents, and his (her) siblings.
The original 1982 stratified sample of 3856 elderly individuals was dra-n
from two populations. The first population, accounting for 2674 of the
elderly in the total sample, was drawn from communities in Massachusetts. In
forming the community sample the state of Massachusetts was divided into 27
home care areas. Within each home care area communities were stratified,
based on population, into large, medium, and small, and communities within
each of the three groups were selected at random. Next HRCA used
Massachusetts police records, which record the ages and addresses of all
Massachusetts residents, to stratify the elderly by age, separating those age
75 and above from those below age 75. Elderly individuals within each
subgroup were then randomly selected. The coilununity and age stratifications
produced an intentional over—representation of the old old as well as the
elderly living in rural communities.—9—
The second population, which accounts for the remaining 1182 elderly in
the 1982 survey, was drawn from elderly participants of all 27 Massachusetts
home health care corporations. In this sample the elderly were again
stratified by age and the older old were oversampled. The sample's selection
procedures are described in more detail in Morris et. al. (1987). The 1982
sample of the elderly included only the non—institutionalized elderly, but
each subsequent survey has followed the initial sample as they changed
residences, including moving into and out of nursing homes.
Each of the HRCA Surveys of the Elderly include detailed questions about
living arrangements and health status. The 1986 reinterview of the elderly
also contains a series of questions of the elderly about their children.
These questions include the names, sexes, frequency of contact and the type of
contact with children, the extent of financial aid given to and received from
children, and the amount of assistance given by children to their elderly
parents in performing activities of daily living. In addition, the 1986
survey contains a set of questions about the elderly respondent's income and
wealth,
At the close of the HRCA elderly survey the elderly respondent was asked
for permission to contact one of his/her children and ask that child to
participate in our child survey. While a random selection of the child
respondents would have been preferable, it was felt that the elderly
respondents would be more cooperative if they were allowed to make the
selection. Because of funding limitations we were able to sample designated
only children of the community sample of elderly; i.e. ,wewere not able to
Contact children of the home care sample of elderly. As mentioned, the
community sample of elderly is a stratified random sample of non—
institutionalized elderly.—10—
Like the HRCA Surveys of the Elderly, The NBER—HRCA Child Survey is a
telephone interview. The Child Survey is roughly 45 minutes in length.
Interviews with the child's spouse were conducted if the child was
unavailable. The questions in the Child Survey concerning the respondent's
and spouse's characteristics include age, marital status, number of young
children, work and health status, occupation, industry, education, grades in
high school, income, and wealth. These questions are also asked of the
respondent about his or her siblings. In addition, the child was asked to
indicate (1) the frequency of contact between each sibling and each sibling's
spouse and the HRCA elderly respondent parent, (2) the amount of financial
assistance each sibling and his spouse give to or receive from the HRCA
elderly respondent parent, and (3) the amount of time each sibling and his
spouse spends with the HRCA elderly respondent per month. The child is also
asked about his parents' and in—laws' health status as well as his parents'
income and net wealth.
The sample size of the initial 1982 Survey of the Elderly is 3856. In
contrast, the 1986 completed sample size of elderly was 2889, with 22.5
percent of the attrition since 1982 due to deaths. In the 1986 data over 90
percent of the elderly are above age 70, over 40 percent are the old old
(above age 85), and over two thirds are females. The size of the NBER—HRCA
Child Survey is 850. Including siblings the number of children of the HRCA
Elderly Survey respondents for whom we have data is 1650.—11—
B. Sample Section
The basic sample used in our statistical analysis contains 1650 children
of 706 elderly respondents. We excluded observations in the case that data is
missing on a child's age, sex, occupation, health, education, marital status,
grades received in school, and employment status. We also excluded children
with missing information on time provided their parent, children less than 18
years of age, children whose co—residence status with the parent respondent
was not reported, and children for whom we are missing data on their parent's
age.
C. Data Characteristics
Of the 706 elderly parents. in our sample, 24 percent are age 55 to 70, 48
percent are age 71 to 80, and 28 percent are above 81 and above. The 1650
children (including siblings of the Child Survey respondents) of these parents
range in age from 18 to 84; 20 percent are under 40, 29 percent are 41 to 50,
33 percent are 51 to 60, and 18 percent are 61 and over. Most of the elderly
parents (70 percent) are females, and most (72 percent) are not married. In
contrast, only 54 percent of children are female, and 76 percent of children
are married. On average there are 2.42 children per elderly parent. A total
of 21 percent of the elderly parents have 1 child, 32 percent have 2 children,
23 percent have 3 children, and 24 percent have 4 or more.
Among elderly who report their total household income, mean income is
$11,247, and median income is $6,250. These and all subsequent dollar figures
are in 1987 dollars. The corresponding figures for child households are
$34,392 and $32,500. Among elderly who report total household net worth, mean
net worth is $93,396 and median net worth is $40,000. The corresponding child
net worth figures are $175,019 and $125,000.—12—
Many of the elderly in our sample are in poor health; indeed 13 percent
of the aample's elderly are in nuraing homes or similar inatitutions, and 15
percent are enrolled in home care programs. In total 40 percent of the
elderly self—report their health as fair or poor (aa oppoaed to excellent or
good). In terms of ADL (activities of daily living) status, the fraction
reporting difficulty or inability in preparing their own meals is 44 percent;
it is 56 percent for the case of taking out garbage, 33 percent for the case
of performing house chores, 22 percent for the case of dressing one's self, 24
percent for the case of taking a bath or shower, 10 percent for the case of
getting out of a chair without assistance, 21 percent for the case of problems
maintaining bladder control, and 28 percent for the case of walking up and
down stairs without assistance.
Not all the children of the elderly are in excellent or good health. A
total of 13 percent of the children report their health (or have their health
reported) to be either fair or poor. In the case of the 1255 spouses of these
children, 14 percent report (have reported) their health to be fair or poor.
In addition to time demands imposed by the elderly parent respondent, the
children in our survey may need to respond to the time demands by their other
parent and their parent in—laws. The fraction of children with two parents is
30 percent. In the case of in—laws information was obtained only for the
child respondents; i.e. ,thesurvey did not ask the child respondents about
their siblings' in—laws. For child respondents the percent with one or two
parent in—laws is 43 percent, and 33 percent of these in—laws are reported to
be in fair or poor health.
A total of 64 percent of the 1729 children in the sample report (or have
reported) that they are employed full—time, and 12 percent report (or have
reported) that they are employed part time. The average annual wages of full——13—
time employed children for those children for whom we have information on
wages is $32,914. Unfortunately, the child survey questionnaire did not
separately ask about the wages plus salary of the child respondent and the
wage plus salary of the child respondent's spouse, but rather asked about
combined household wage and salary income. And in the case of the questions
about siblings, the survey only asks about the total income of the sibling and
the sibling's spouse; it does not separately ask about siblings' wages and
salaries.
In the Tobit and mayimum likelihood estimation we use an imputed full—
time wage based on a regression of wages of child respondents or their spouses
who report they are working full—time and for whom we can determine their
wages plus salaries. As an example, in the case the respondent child is
married, reports that he (she) works full—time, and also reports that his
(her) spouse does not work, we know that the wages plus salaries of the couple
are those of the child respondent. In this wage regression we use education
dummies for years of education, grades in school, occupation, sex, health
dummies, and a third order polynomial in age as explanatory variables.2
III. Model Estimation.
A. Tobit Estimates:
The Tobit model can be viewed as a test of a simpler version of the
structural model presented above. It corresponds to the case that the amount
of work the child does (which may be zero) is exogenously given, and the child
simply divides his (her) non—work time between leisure and time spent with his
(her) parent. In this simpler model consumption is exogeneously determined by
the sum of exogenous non—labor plus labor income, so the child maximizes U —
+ subject to diO, where stands for 1 minus—14—
the exogenously determined supply of labor. For this model equation (7) is
modified to:






The provision of time is positive if the square bracket in (7') equals zero,
and it ia zero if the square bracket is negative; i.e., d—O if
O>[—$(Zjøidj+m)+A]/(l—fl) holds, otherwise di—[--fi(Sj0d+m)+A]/(l_fi). Let the
right hand side of this last equality equal xi'y +€, wherex is a vector of
characteristics of child i and his (her) parent and includes the amount of
time provided to his (her) parent by his (her) siblings (Ej0id). and is a
standard normal error. Then d equals zero if the indicator function —
+isnegative and equals I if the indicator is positive. But this is
the standard Tobit model. Using data on all child respondents and their
siblings and taking, for each observation, the time provided by all the other
siblings as one of the x's in the Tobit regression appears to be appropriate
provided the error terms, the €j's are uncorrelated across siblings.
Our actual Tobit model is a slight modification of the standard Tobit
specification to take account of the 29 percent of children in our sample
whose parents live with them. In these cases it is obvious that the child
spends time with the parent, but we are not sure how to assess the amount of
time. To accommodate these data we treat these observations as observations
for which time provided by the child is positive, but the exact amount of time
is unknown. The standard Tobit has two pieces of the likelihood function
corresponding to the probability of no time provided and the probability of a
specific amount of time provided. We add to the standard likelihood function—15—
a statement for the probability of providing positive time, which is simply 1
minus the probability of providing zero time.
The time question in the Child Survey that provides the dependent
variable for our analysis is: "In the last month, how many hours did you (and
your spouse) spend with your parents, visiting, going out together, and/or
helping him/her/them?" Of the 1179 children in the Tobit sample who are not
living with the elderly respondent parent, 29 percent report (or have
reported) spending zero time per month with their elderly parent. Another 31
percent report spending 1—10 hours per month; 18 percent report spending 11—20
hours per month, 9 percent report 21—30 hours per month, 5 percent report 31—
40 hours per month, and 8 percent report spending 41 or more hours per month.
Excluding children living with their parents, the average number of hours
provided per month is 15, and the median number is 8. Within this subsample
of non—co—resident children, average and median hours provided by only
children are 24 and 16; average and median hours (per child) provided by
children with one sibling are 16 and 9; and average and median hours (per
child) provided by children with two or more siblings are 12 and 5.
Tables 1 through 4 report results from four Tobit regressions. The first
regression includes a set of 33 regressors (excluding the intercept). It does
not, however, include the sum of time provided by siblings as a regressor. In
considering the results it is important to keep in mind first, that time spent
with the parent, d, is a censored variable, and second, that the change in
expected time spent in response to a unit change in one of the regressor
variables is the change in the unconditional expectation E(d]; i.e., the
reported coefficients correspond to the product of Tobit coefficients times
the probability that time spent is positive.—16—
The first Set of regressors in Table 1 (mr2—mr4) are dummies for the
child's marital status. The dummy for married child (mrl) was excluded. AS
would be expected, separated/divorced, widowed, and never—married children
provide more time to parents. Of these separated/divorced children provide
very little additional time as compared to married children. Widowed children
provide the most time to parents. The coefficients on all three dummies are,
however, insignificant.
The dummy for married parents (pml) was ommitted from the regression.
The coefficients on parent's marital Status indicate that as compared to
married parents, divorced/separated parents (pm2) receive less time, but the
standard error here is very large. In contrast, widowed parents' (pm3)
receive substantially more time; and the coefficient is quite significant.
The next set of dummies (em2 and em3) are coded 1 when the child
employment status is part—time (960 hours per year), and not—working. The
dummy for children who have full—time (1920 hours per year) employment status
(eml) was excluded. As can be expected, children who are working part—time
provide marginally more time as compared to children working full—time.
However, contrary to expectations, those who are not working provide
substantially less time to parents as compared to children who are employed
full—time. The former coefficient is insignificant while the latter is very
close to significant. The dummy for child's spouse being employed either
full—time or part—time (sempi) is positive. The coefficient, however, is
insignificant.
The next variable (ns) indicates the number of siblings. A larger number
of siblings may be expected to reduce the amount of time provided by each
child since parent dependence on any one child would be lower. Moreover, if
siblings free—ride on each other's time provision to the parent, a larger—17—
number of siblings would provide additional scope for such free—riding
behavior. The regression shows that, after controlling for other influences,
the presence of additional siblings reduces the provision of time to parents
by about 1 hour per month for each additional sibling. The coefficient on
this variable is significant at the 10 percent level, but not the 5 percent
level.
The dummy for the child's sex (sx) was set to equal 1 for male children.
The coefficient suggests that male children who spend time, spend about 7
hours less per month than female children who spend time. The parent's sex
dummy (psx), which also has a value of one for males, has a negative
coefficient of —0.62 hours, but is not significant.
As expected, the dummy for, child's self—reported health being 'poor'
(h14) shows a large negative effect on time spent with parent, and the
coefficient is significant.'Poor' health of spouse (sph4) may be expected to
curtail the amount of time spent by the child with the parent. However, the
opposite result is obtained from the regression. The coefficient on sph4 is
positive, but insignificant. The variable (ph4) is a dummy for parent's self—
reported health status being 'poor'. As expected, the time provided by
children is higher for parents whose health status is 'poor', but the
coefficient is not significant.
The variable padl is a sum of 14 dummies, each having a value of one if
the parent is unable to preform specific tasks, and a value of zero
otherwise.3 A larger value of padi thus represents a higher degree of parent
disability. The coefficient on this variable is positive and significant.
Ita value is close to one, indicating that for every additional count of
disability the child spends an additional hour per month with the parent.—18—
The coefficient on the dummy indicating whether the parent is in a
nursing home or similar institution (ply), is large, negative, and quite
significant. The result suggests that such parents receive substantially less
time from their children. A large, negative, and significant impact on
child's time also arises in the case the parent receives services from a home
care corporation (phc). Parents receiving 'Meals on Wheels' are represented
as 1 in the next dummy variable (pwh). The coefficient is negative, but not
significant. These results suggest that children substitute for their own
time by using institutions, home care corporations, etc. to care fro their
eldelry parents.
Older children spend less time with parents, but the coefficient on
child's age (ag) is not significant. Older parents receive substantially more
time, and the coefficient on parent's age (pag) is significant.
The next two dummies (milh4 and filh4) have a value of one if mother—in—
law's or father—in—law's health, as reported by the child is 'poor', for
children who have either of these parents—in—law, Surprisingly, the
coefficient on the former is highly positive and quite significant.2 The
coefficient on father—in—law's health is negative and insignificant.
Do children substitute financial transfers for time transfers to parents
and do parents buy time from children? The variable (fhlpl) is a dummy that
assumes a value of one if the child made positive financial transfers to the
parent within the past year. According to the coefficient on fhlpl, children
who make such transfers spend about 11 hours more per month with parents than
children who do not. The coefficient on this variable is significant. The
dummy indicating whether the parent made a financial transfer to the child
(phlpl) has a large negative coefficient, and this too is significant. Both
parts of the question posed above are thus answered in the negative.—19—
Higher total income of the parent (pyv) when parent income is reported ia
associated with aubstantially less time devoted by the child to the parent,
but the coefficient is not significant. Higher total income of the child
(kyv) is also associated with less time spent by the child with the parent,
but again the coefficient is insignificant. The signs on both these
coefficients are plausible: Parents with larger income can afford to buy
supervisory and care services, and are, therefore, less dependent on their
children, and children with higher incomes would be expected to have a higher
opportunity cost of time.
If expectations of bequests are important determinants of parent—child
relationships one would expect richer parents to receive more time from their
children and richer children to provide less time to parents. The regression
indicates that parents with higher net worth (pwlv) receive more time from
children, and children with higher net worth (kwlv) spend less time with
parents. The coefficients on both these variables are, however,
insignificant.
Children with m higher wage rates (wage) spend somewhat less time with
their parents. The coefficient on the wage rate is quite significant.
Table 2 repeats the Tobit of Table I, but also includes the totml amount
of time provided by siblings (sibtm) as a regressor. The introduction of this
extra regressor does not substantially alter the estimated coefficients and
standard errors for the rest of the variables. More time provided by siblings
(sibtm) is associated with a very small reduction in the amount of time
provided by the child and the coefficient is insignificant.
Table 3 reports Tobit results for the subsample that excludes children
who live with their parents. In this-subsample the intercept is much lsrger.
Coefficients on two out of the three dummies for child's marital status have—20—
the opposite signs as compared to those in Table 1. Now children who are
divorced/separated or never—married spend less time with parents as compared
to married children, s result that seems implausible. The coefficients on all
three child marital—status dummies are, however, insignificant. Unlike Table
1, Table 3 shows that children who are employed part—time (em2) spend less
time with parents as compared to children employed full—time, though the
coefficient is sgain not significant. Non—working children (em3) still spend
less time with parents than those employed full—time, but the coefficient is
now clearly significant.
The variable for number of siblings (ns) is significant and larger in
absolute value in Table 3 as compared with Table 1. The coefficient on the
dummy for parents receiving home—care services is now a much smaller negative
number and is insignificant.Table 3 shows a much smaller though still
positive coefficient on the index for parent disability (padl), and the
coefficient is now insignificant. This indicates that in the subsample of
non—co—resident parents and children, children seem to spend very little
additional time with parents when the degree of parent disability is higher.
Table 4 repeats Table 3, but also includes the total amount of time
provided by siblings (sibtm) as a regressor. Surprisingly the coefficient on
time spent by siblings enters with a positive sign though it is still not
significant. The coefficient on the number of siblings variable (ns) in Table
4 is negative and significant. This seems to suggest that in the subsample
under consideration siblings divide the total time spent with the parent
amongst themselves. However, for any given family size, increased time spent
by one child seems to induce additional time transfers from siblings. This
interpretation must however be viewed with caution given that the coefficient
on time spent by siblings is not significant.—21—
B. Estimates for the Structural Model:
Tables 5 and 6 present maximum likelihood regression results for the
structural model presented in Section I.The data used for this estimation is
a subsample of 415 respondent children who do not live with their parent, and
for whom valid data on labor and non—labor income are available.4 Table 5
presents estimated values for the coefficient vectors 9 and contained in the
regression equations used to model the parameters of the utility function (1),
viz, 1oga —x'9+ pj (equation 1 in the table) and log —x1'+ Ui
(equation 2 in the table). For this analysis, total disposable time available
for an individual per year was taken to be 4380 hours (assuming 12 hours of
disposable time per day). The estimation procedure assumes that and
(i—IN) are independently and identically distributed. The vector of child
and parent characteristics, x, contains a subset of the variables used as
regressors in the Tobit model.
The structural estimates are somewhat disappointing. With the exception
of the intercepts and the coefficient on the number of siblings (ns) in column
1, all of the coefficients of the structural estimates that are significant.
Using the estimated valuesand 3anda given configuration of the vector x
we can obtain the individual—specific preference parameters a and fi.The
optimal choices of the time transfer to parent (d) and the amount of leisure
(i) can then be inferred by setting the terms within the square brackets of
(6) and (7) to equal zero and simultaneously solving the two resultant
equations. If the optimal choice of d turns out to be negative, a corner
solution is imposed by setting d to zero and recomputing the optimum amount of
leisure.—22—
The first row of Table 6 presents the choices of d and 1 for a
hypothetical individual assuming mean values of the characteristic vector x
computed over the 415 observations used in the estimation.5 Subsequent rows
of Table 6 present the the choices of d and .2 that result from changing the
value of one of the elements in vector x (as indicated) while maintaining the
others at their mean values. The columns labeled d and ai indicate the
change in d and .2 from their respective values in the first row of the table.
The results in Table 6 indicate that out of a total of 4380 hours per year a
hypothetical individual with mean characteristics spends 50 hours per year
with the parent, conaumes 3368 hours of leisure per year, and works for the
remaining 962 hours.
Divorced/separated children (mr2) and widowed children (mr3) spend more
time with their parents than do married children (the dummy for which (mrl)
was excluded). A corner solution on time spent with the parent is obtained
when the value of the dummy for never—married children (mr4) is set at unity.
All non—married children consume less leisure than married children. These
results confirm those of Table 4 (which is also based on a sample of non—co—
resident parents and children): Widowed children spend the most, and never—
married children the least, amounts of time with their parents.
A corner solution is also obtained when the parent's marital status is
separated/divorced (pm2) rather than married (the dummy for which (pml) was
excluded). Compared with children whose parents are married, children with a
widowed parent (pm3) spend more time with the parent and also consume slightly
less leisure.
Children whose spouses work full—time or part—time (sempl) spend more
time with parenta and consume a slightly lower amount of leisure. This is
also consistent with the results of Table 4.—23—
The larger the number of siblings (ns), the greater the amount of time
spent by the child with parent and the lower the amount of leisure consumed.
This effect is surprisingly large. The Tobit specification showed that a
larger number of siblings reduces the time spent by the child with the parent.
Unlike the Tobit model, however, the leisure decision is endogenous in the
structural model. A possible explanation of this result is that with fixed
time spent by siblings, a larger number of siblings implies smaller lengths of
visits to parent by each sibling. To compensate the child reduces his
consumption of leisure and increases the time spent with parent.
Changing the value of the child's sex dummy (sx) to 1 results in a sharp
decline in the amount of time spent with the parent and the amount of leisure
consumed decreases by 384 hoursper year. A similar, though much smaller,
reduction is obtained in both time spent and consumption of leisure when the
parent's sex dummy is set to unity.
Corner solutions are obtained for both the endogenous variables when
child's health (hl4) or child's spouse's health (sph4) dummies are
alternatively set to unity. A substantially larger amount of time transfer is
induced when the parent has 'poor' health (ph4). Children with parents
residing in a nursing home or similar institution (ply) spend less time with
the parent and consume substantially more leisure. There is a substantial
decline in time spent by children when the parent receives home care services
(phc), although the increase in the child's consumption of leisure is slight.
These results are consistent with those of Table 4. Contrary to the results
of Table 4, the child seems to spend much more time when the parent is
receiving 'Meals—on—Wheels' (pwh).
Surprisingly, and in contradiction to earlier results, Table 6 shows that
the time spent by children declines, and the amount of leisure consumed—24—
increases, with increasing degree of disability (padi) of the parent. Another
surprising and puzzling result is that children with a mother or father—in—law
with poor health make large time transfers to the parent.
The results obtained by perturbing values of child and parent ages,
child's non—labor income, child's wage rate, parent's income, and child and
parent wealth variables are all consistent with those of Table 4. The
negative effect of time spent by siblings on the time spent by the child is
not consistent with the result in Table 4. However, it is the "built in"
prediction of the structural specification which assumes that siblings play
non—cooperative Nash.
IV. Conclusion
The data reveal some clear patterns of time transfers from children to
their elderly parents. Children appear to use institutions and home care as a
substitute for their own provision of time. Parents who reside in nursing
homes or are enrolled in home care programs receive, ceteris paribus, less
than half the amount of time received by those in the community. The
provision of time is strongly correlated with the age of the elderly parent;
other things equal, the old old receive over twice the time of theyoung old.
The sex, age, and health status of children are additional important
determinants of time provided to the elderly. Male children and younger
children spend relatively little time with their parents. Children withpoor
health spend almost no time with their parents. If the spouse of the child is
in poor health, the child also gives very little time, at least according to
the structural model's results.
Other things equal, those elderly who self—report their health to be
'poor' appear to receive over twice the amount of time received by elderly—25—
with better self—reports of health. Surprisingly, the degree of elderly
disability does not appear to affect the amount of time provided to those
elderly not living with their children, although it is a significant
determinant in the larger sample that includes elderly living with their
children.
The Tobit results for the entire sample of children, including those
living with their elderly parents, indicate that more time is provided by
single children and more time is received by single elderly, at least those
who are widowed. In the structural model the effects of the child's and
parent's marital status on time provided to the elderly are less clear, but
there is strong evidence that widowed children spend substantially more time
with their elderly parents.
The structural model predicts that more time provided by siblings will
lead to substantially less time provided by the child in question. However,
this prediction is, to a large extent, simply the implication of the form of
the structural model we have adopted. In the less constrained Tobit
estimation there is no evidence that siblings free—ride on each others'
provision of time.
Both the Tobit and the structural estimates indicate a small effect
associated with higher children's wage rates; children with higher wage rates
provide somewhat less time to their elderly parents than other children. In
contrast to the modest effect of higher wage rates, the effect of larger
values of children's wealth is quite sizable. Wealthier children and children
with higher incomes appear to provide less time than poorer children, but the
standard errors around these effects are quite large.
The standard errors on the effects of parent's wealth and income are also
sizable. Onemightsummarize the findings here by saying that there is—26—
certainly no strong evidence thst richer psrents receive more time than poorer
parents; i.e. ,thepaper provides little, if any, support for the Bernheim,
Schleiffer, and Summers (1986) view that richer parents, in effect, purchaae
more time from their children.
To summarize, the results indicate that the main determinants of the
amount of time given to parents are demographic. Economic variables, such as
wage rate and income levels, appear to play a rather insignificant role in the
provision of time.—27—
Key to variables used in Tobit rearessions.
mr2 —1if child is separated/divorced
mr3 —1if child is widowed
mr4 —1if child is never—married
pm2 —1if parent is widowed
pm3 —1if parent is divorced/separated
em2 —1if child is employed part—time
em3 —1if child is not—working
sempl —1if child's spouse is employed full— or part—time
ns —numberof siblings
ax —1if child is male
psx —1if parent is male
h14 —1if child rages his/her heslth as 'poor'
sph4 —1if child's spouse's health is 'poor'
ph4 —1if parent rates his/her health as 'poor'
padl —indexof disability (see text)
ply —1if parent lives in nursing home or similar
institution
phc —1if parent receives home care services
pwh —1if parent receives Meals—on—Wheels
ag —child'sage divided by 50
pag —parent'sage divided by 50
milh4 —1if mother—in—law's health is reported 'poor'
filh4 —1if father—in—law's health is reported 'poor'
fhlpl —1if child made financial transfers to parent within
the last year
phlpl —1if parent made financial transfers to child within
the last year
pym —1if data on parent's total income is missing
pyv —parentstotal income times one minus pym
(in $100,000)
kyin —1if data on child's total income is missing
kyv —child'stotal income times one minus kym
(in $100,000)
pwlm —1if data on net worth of parent is missing
pwlv —parent'snet worth times one minus pwlm
(in $500,000)
kwlm —1if data on net worth of child is missing
kwlv —child'snet worth times one minus kwlm
(in $500,000)
wage —child'swage rate (unit —$ 10.00per hour)
sibtm —totaltime provided by siblings of child
knly —non—laborincome of child
sig2 —estimatedvariance coefficient—28—
Table 1: Result from Tobit resressjon of Time SDent by Child with Parent
instChildand Parent characteristics.
Parameter Coefficient Std Error t—Statjstjc
intercept 6.08 7.56 0.80
mr2 0.25 2.19 0.11
mr3 3.68 2.99 1.23
mr4 2.52 3.01 0.84
pm2 —2.22 3.39 —0.65
pm3 5.64 1.52 3.71
em2 0.15 2.12 0.07
em3 —4.06 2.08 —1.95
sempi 0.98 1.54 0.64
ns —0.74 0.39 —1.88
sx —5.47 1.33 —4.13
psx —0.62 1.50 —0.41
h14 —13.81 5.69 —2.43
sph4 1.62 3.16 0.51
ph4 4.38 2.71 1.62
padl 0.77 0.32 2.40
ply —17.72 2.83 —6.27
phc —7.45 1.74 —4.29
pwh —2.38 2.46 —0.97
ag 11.41 3.46 3.30
pag —0.83 8.75 —0.09
milh4 8.23 3.20 2.57
filh4 —13.81 5.70 —2.42
fhlpl —2.27 4.83 —0.47
phlpl 15.66 6.09 2.57
pym —2.79 1.70 —1.65
pyv —29.73 17.44 —1.70
kym —0.24 4.61 —0.05
kyv —17.04 15.48 —1.10
pwlm —1.16 1.74 —0.67
pwlv 1.72 1.89 0.91
kwlm —1.68 3.64 —0.46
kwlv —1.08 1.53 —0.71
wage —0.55 0.14 —4.05
sig2 615.26 17.23 35.72
Loglikelihoodfunction ——4342.49
Number of observations —1650—29—
Table 2: Result from rearession of Time Soent by Child with Parent aainsc
Child and Parent characteristics. Includes Time Soent by Siblings as a
rearessor.
Parameter Coefficient Std. Error t—Statistjc
intercept 6.21 7.57 0.82
nir2 0.29 2.19 0.13
mr3 3.62 3.01 1.20
mr4 2.52 3.02 0.83
pm2 —2.40 3.41 —0.70
pin3 5.57 1.53 3.65
em2 0.10 2.12 0.05
em3 —4.15 2.09 —1.99
sempi 1.02 1.54 0.67
ns —0.63 0.41 —1.55
sx —5.45 1.33 —4.11
psx —0.67 1.51 —0.44
h14 —13.86 5.67 —2.44
sph4 1.71 3.17 0.54
ph4 4.54 2.71 1.68
padi 0.78 0.32 2.40
ply —17.98 2.87 —6.27
phc —7,42 1.73 —4.28
pwh —2.50 2.46 —1.01
milh4 11.38 3.47 3.28
filh4 —1.17 8.75 —0.13
fhlpl 8.19 3.21 2.55
phipi —13.67 5.73 —2.39
ag —2.14 4.84 —0.44
pag 15.74 6.10 2.58
pym —2.87 1.70 —1.69
pyv —30.34 17.47 —1.74
kym —0.40 4.63 —0.09
kyv —17.86 15.52 —1.15
pwlm —1.12 1.74 —0.64
pwlv 1.68 1.89 0.89
kwlm —1.70 3.66 —0.47
kwlv —1.04 1.53 —0.68
wage —0.56 0.14 —4.09
sibtm —0.01 0.01 —0.94
sig2 616.63 17.33 35.59
Loglikelihoodfunction ——4342.10
Number of observations —1650—30—
Table 3: Result from Tobit repression of Time Soent by Child with Parent
aaainst Child and Parent characteristics. Includes only Children not livinp
with Parent.
Paraneter Coefficient Std. Error t—Statistic
intercept 13.13 7.50 1.75
mr2 —1.15 2.19 —0.52
mr3 2.82 2.98 0.95
mr4 —4.71 3.56 —1.32
pm2 —5.84 3.45 —1.69
pm3 2.31 1.52 1.52
em2 —0.76 2.15 —0.36
em3 —4.62 2.09 —2.21
sempl 1.50 1.53 0.98
na —1.79 0.41 —4.37
ax —5.13 1.35 —3.81
pax —0.93 1.51 —0.62
h14 —15.40 7.10 —2.17
sph4 1.65 3.08 0.53
ph4 4.01 2.71 1.48
padi 0.06 0.32 0.18
ply —5.98 2.90 —2.06
phc —1.22 1.76 —0.69
pwh —0.55 2.50 —0.22
milh4 10.77 3.34 3.22
filh4 —1.03 8.25 —0.13
fhlpl 9.91 3.15 3.14
phlpl —18.81 6.90 —2.73
ag —1.21 4.89 —0.25
pag 9.34 6.10 1.53
pym —1.99 1.75 —1.13
pyv —9.12 17.75 —0.51
kym —1.67 4.95 —0.34
kyv —20.53 14,89 —1.38
pwlm —0.90 1.77 —0.51
pwlv 1.61 1.95 0.83
kwlm —1.92 3.84 —0.50
kwlv —0.02 1.45 —0.01
wage —0.52 0.14 —3.84
sig2 686.34 21.69 31.65
Log likelihood function ——4197.25
Number of observations — 1179—31—
Table 4: Results from Tobit regression of Time SDent by Child against Child
and Parent characteristics. SamDle Includes only Children not livina with
Parent. Includes Time Soent by Siblings as a regressor.
Parameter Coefficient Std. Error t—Statistic
intercept 13.19 7.51 1.76
mr2 —1.17 2.19 —0.53
mr3 2.91 2.99 0.97
mr4 —4.76 3.54 —1.34
pm2 —5.64 3.46 —1.63
pm3 2.37 1.53 1.55
em2 —0.69 2.15 —0.32
em3 —4.51 2.10 —2.15
sempi 1.45 1.53 0.95
ns —1.92 0.43 —4.48
sx —5.16 1.35 —3.83
psx —0.85 1.52 —0.56
h14 —15.26 7.13 —2.14
sph4 1.50 3.10 0.48
ph4 3.81 2.73 1.40
padi 0.03 0.33 0.08
ply —5.56 2.99 —1.86
phc —1.19 1.77 —0.67
pwh —0.38 2.50 —0.15
milh4 10.81 3.34 3.24
filh4 —0.81 8.26 —0.10
fhlpl 10.00 3.15 3.18
phipi —19.14 6.95 —2.75
ag —1.33 4.89 —0.27
pag 9.09 6.12 1.49
pym —1.88 1.75 —1.07
pyv —8.30 17.73 —0.47
kym —1.40 4.95 —0.28
kyv —19.62 14.86 —1.32
pwlm —0.92 1.77 —0.52
pwlv 1.66 1.94 0.86
kwlm —1.95 3.84 —0.51
kwlv —0.05 1.45 —0.03
wage —0.51 0.14 —3.77
sibtm 0.01 0.01 0.96
sig2 685.16 21.68 31.60
Log likelihood function — —4196.68
Number of observations — 1179—32—
Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Structural Model.
Equation 1 () Equation2 ()
ParameterCoefficient S.Et—Statistic Coefficient S.E. t—Statjstjc
intercept 5.50 2.61 2.11 5.45 2.73 1.99
mr2 —0.79 1.03 —0.77 0.2]. 1.06 0.20
mr3 —1.28 1.29 —0.99 —0.26 1.02 —0.26
mr4 0.42 1.39 0.30 0.98 1.30 0.75
pm2 1.25 1.76 0.71 1.42 1.84 0.77
pm3 —0.28 0.52 —0.54 0.02 0.55 0.03
sempl —0.64 0.59 —1.09 —0.33 0.57 —0.58
ns —0.34 0.17 —1.99 —0.26 0.17 —1.57
sx 0.23 0.46 0.51 0.89 0.48 1.84
psx 0.09 0.49 0.18 0.38 0.54 0.71
h14 2.38 6.27 0.38 0.28 12.39 0.02
sph4 1.26 0.83 1.52 —1.12 1.16 —0.97
ph4 —0.41 0.96 —0.43 —0.10 0.95 —0.11
padl 0.03 0.11 0.26 0.03 0.12 0.24
ply 0.33 0.80 0.41 —0.35 1.07 —0.32
phc 0.32 0.64 0.50 0.29 0.67 0.43
pwh —0.28 1.01 —0.28 0.12 0.93 0.13
mjlh4 0.06 0.65 0.09 —1.05 1.07 —0.98
filh4 —0.37 2.68 —0.14 —0.15 2.62 —0.06
fhlpl —1.29 1.22 —1.06 —0.35 1.03 —0.34
ag 0.03 1.77 0.02 —1.65 1.87 —0.88
pag —1.46 2.23 —0.65 —1.43 2.39 —0.60
pym 0.18 0.58 0.31 0.04 0.65 0.05
pyv 4.38 15.12 0.29 3.13 15.39 0.20
kwlm 0.91 3.27 0.28 0.92 3.87 0.24
kwlv 0.58 0.33 1.76 0.62 0.39 1.56
pwlm 0.22 0.64 0.34 0.07 0.73 0.10
pwlv —0.28 0.60 —0.46 —0.27 0.76 —0.36
Log Likelihood function: —1600.03
Number of Observations: 415
Note:
a) The variables knly, sibtm, and wage are part of the structural
specification and have therefore been omitted from x, the vector of
characteristics.
b) Work—time is endogenous and therefore cml and em2 have been omitted
from vector x.
c) This subsample has no observation with parent making a financial
transfer to the child. Hence the variable phlpl was omitted from
vector x.
d) Asymptotic Standard Errors (S.E.) and t—Statistics are tabulated.—33—
Table 6: Choices of d and I Imolied by Estimated Parameters.
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child's age —meanage + 10 66
child's age —meanage — 10 30
parent age —meanage + 10 115
parent age —meanage — 10 0
parent income —meanincome +2000 47
parent income —meanincome —2000 53
child's wealth —meanwealth +10000 39
child's wealth —meanwealth —10000 62
parent wealth —meanwealth +10000 51
parent wealth —meanwealty —10000 49
wage —meanwage + 5 46
wage —meanwage — 5 56
sibtm —sibtm + 20 31
aibtm —sibtm — 20 69
knly —knly +2000 54

















































1.The mean amountoftransfers from children to parents, when positive, is
$2159 per year.
2. It was confirmed that the high positive and significant coefficient on the
mother—in—law health dummy was not due to outliers in the data.
3. There are 157 of observations in the wage regression. The R2 from the wage
regression is .61. The coefficients (standard errors) from this regression
are Intercept ——28194.65(71464.92), Age of child —1017.71(4700.80), Age2 —
—5.97(104.17), Age3 —0.063,(0.751), Dummyfor1—8 years of education ——
1599.56(6424.95), Dummy for 9—12 years of education ——960.82 (2236.20),
Dummy for reported health as 'excellent' —2165.11(11436.56), Dummy for
reported health as 'good' ——1619.78(11388.68), Dummy for reported health as
'fair' —1174.45(12058.25), Dummy for reported grade in school as 'A' —
—4827.79(12185.82), Dummy for reported grade ''— 4269.33(11795.60), Dummy forreported grade 'C' —1700.29(11654.26), Dummy for reported grade 'D'—
—7531.44 (11800.93), Dummy for occupation code 2 —28664.68(16807.28), Dummy foroccupation code 3 —1588959(17069.44), Dummy for occupation code 4 —
17508.99(17049.96), Dummy for occupation code 5 —13341.80(16908.94), Dummy foroccupation code 6 14808.53 (17332.27), Dummy for occupation code 7 —
13973.28(16926.66), Dummy for male —19662.50(2085.96).
4. The variable padl is the sum of 14 activity dummies. These dummies had a
value of 1 if:
—parentdoes not go out of building of residence more than once a week. —parentdoes not prepare ownmeals.
—parentthinks he/she does not get enough to eat.
—parentdoes not take Out garbage him/herself.
—parentnot healthy enough to do ordinary work around the house. —parenthas problems dressing by him/herself. —parentunable to prepare bath and dry self.
—parentunable to get up out of ordinary chair without help.
—parenthas bladder accidents.
—parentunable to climb up or down stairs without help.
—parentis confined to bed.
—parentinclined to wander and/or get lost.
—parentneeds constant supervision.
—parentuses either walker, 4—pronged cane, crutches, or wheelchair at
least some of the time to get around.
5. Observations were deleted if data on wage income was positive but the child
reported employee status indicated he/she was not working, or if data on wage
income was missing






























Andrews,Emily and Michael Hurd, "Employee Benefits and Retirement Income
Adequacy: Data, Research and Policy Issues," mimeo March 1990.
Bernheim, Douglas, Andre Shleiffer, and Lawrence Summers, "Bequests as A Means
of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 93, 1986.
Boskin, Michael J. ,LaurenceJ. Kotlikoff, and Michael Knetter, "Changes in
the Age Distribution of Income in the United States, 1968—1984," NBER working
paper no. 1766, October 1985.
Kobrin, F.E. 1976a. "The fall in household size and the rise of the primary
individual in the United States." Demoeraohy 13: 127—138.
Kobrin, F.E. l976b. "The primary individual and the family: changes in
living arrangements in the United States since 1950." Journal of Marriage and
the Family 8: 233—238.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. and John Morris, "How Much Care do the Aged Receive
from their Children? —ABimodal Picture of Contact and Assistance," in The
Economics of Aaina, David Wise, ed. ,Chicago,Ill.: Chicago University Press,
1989.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. and John Morris, "Why Don't the Elderly Live with their
Children? A New Look," forthcoming in NBER Conference Volume on the Economics
of the Aged, 1990.
Michael, R.T., V.R. Fuchs, and S.R. Scott. 1980. "Changes in the propensity
to live alone, 1950—1976." Demograohy 17: 39—56.
Moon, M. "The role of the family in the economic well—being of the elderly."
The Gerontoloaist 23(1): 45—50.
Moon, M. 1977. The Measurement of Economic Welfare: Its Apolication of the
Ared Poor. Academic Press: New York.
Morgan, James N., "The Role of Time in the Measurement of Transfers and Well-
Being," in Maryiln Moon, ed., Economic Transfers in the United States, NBER
Volume no. 49, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Morris, J.N. and S. Sherwood, "Informal Support Resources for Vulnerable
Elderly Persons: Can They Be Counted On; Why Do They Work?" International
Journal of Arms and Human Develooment 18(2), 1983—1984.
Morris, John M., Claire E. Gutkin, Clarence C. Sherwood, and Ellen Bernstein,
"Interest in Long Term Care Insurance." Final Report in connection with HCFA
Cooperative Agreement no. l8—C—98375/l, June 1987.
Sandefur, Gary D. and Nancy Brandon Tuma, "Social and Economic Trends Among
the Aged in the United States, 1940—1985," February, 1987.
Soldo, Beth J. ,"TheRole of Demograhic Composition in Accounting for Changes
in the Distribution of Living Arrangements among the Elderly: 1960—1970."—37--
Presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America,
1977.
Wolf, Douglas, "Kinship and the Living Arrangements of Older Americans."
Final report to the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development,
The Urban Institute, 1983.
Wolf, Douglas, 1984. "Kin Availability and the Living Arrangements of Older
Women," Social Science Research 13(1), 1984.